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INTRODUCTION
Solomon Linda was born in 1909 in South Africa, and grew up
in Ladysmith, Zululand, a region located in South Africa.1 He
“never learned to read or write.”2 He did, however, know how to
sing in a high soprano voice,3 and after a childhood of singing with
friends,4 he began singing to the local black workforce at various
hostels and beer halls on the weekends.5 Linda’s style, which later
became known as Mbube, a soprano voice sung over four-part
harmonies, became extremely popular and widely imitated.6
In 1939, Linda recorded his locally popular song titled Mbube,
the Zulu word for “lion,” which was inspired by his childhood as a
cattle herder in the untamed hinterlands.7 The song was a huge
hit.8 Mbube sold approximately 100,000 copies, and Solomon
Linda became a household name in South Africa.9
1

Independent Lens, A Lion’s Trail, http://www.pbs.org/independentlens/
lionstrail/trail.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2009) [hereinafter A Lion’s Trail].
2
Sharon LaFraniere, In the Jungle, the Unjust Jungle, a Small Victory, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 22, 2006, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/22/international/
africa/22lion.html?r=1&scp=3&sq=solomon%20linda&st=cse.
3
Id.
4
A Lion’s Trail, supra note 1.
5
LaFraniere, supra note 2.
6
See id.; see also A Lion’s Trail, supra note 1. Mbube later transitioned into another
style of Zulu a capella singing known as isicathamiya, which is characterized by a
harmonious blend of voices and embodied most famously today by Ladysmith Black
Mambazo. See Wikipedia, Isicathamiya, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isicathamiya (last
visited Sept. 20, 2009).
7
See A Lion’s Trail, supra note 1; see also Rian Malan, In the Jungle, ROLLING
STONE, May 25, 2000, at 54 (“It was a simple three-chord ditty with lyrics something
along the lines of ‘Lion! Ha! You’re a lion!’ inspired by an incident in the Birds’
collective Zulu boyhood when they chased lions that were stalking their fathers’ cattle.”).
8
See A Lion’s Trail, supra note 1. To hear a sample of the 1939 recording, along
with dozens of cover versions of the song, see YouTube, MBUBE,
http://www.youtube.com/user/FLORENCOM (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
9
See Malan, supra note 7. Malan wrote:
In the jungle, the mighty jungle, the lion sleeps tonight. Griffith
Motsieloa must have realized he’d captured something special,
because that chunk of beeswax was shipped all the way to England
and shipped back in the form of ten-inch 78-rpm records, which went
on sale just as Hitler invaded Poland. Marketing was tricky, because
there was hardly any black radio in 1939, but the song went out on
“the re-diffusion,” a land line that pumped music, news and “native
affairs” propaganda into black neighborhoods, and people began
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Soon after, American folk singer Pete Seeger discovered the
song and, after mispronouncing the main refrain, covered it with
his band, The Weavers, calling it Wimoweh10—and all with
negligible compensation to Linda.11 There followed several
different cover versions by different groups;12 in 1961, American
songwriter George Weiss took Linda’s melody and added the
lyrics, “In the jungle, the mighty jungle.”13
Weiss was “[a] civilized chap with a Juilliard degree, [and] he
didn’t much like the primitive wailing,” but he recognized the
enormous potential in Linda’s catchy refrain14 and dismantled
Wimoweh to create his masterpiece.15 In Weiss’s version, “[t]he
chant remained unchanged, but the melody—Solomon Linda’s
miracle melody—moved to center stage, becoming the tune itself,
to which the new words were sung: ‘In the jungle, the mighty
jungle.’”16 This version was recorded by The Tokens and became
a world-wide hit.17
trickling into stores to ask for it. The trickle grew into a steady
stream that just rolled on for years and years, necessitating so many
re-pressings that the master disintegrated. By 1948, “Mbube” had
sold in the region of 100,000 copies, and Solomon Linda was the
undefeated and undefeatable champion of hostel singing competitions
and a superstar in the world of Zulu migrants.
Id.
10

See id. (“[H]e got out pen and paper and started transcribing the song, but he
couldn’t catch the words through all the hissing on the disc. The Zulus were chanting,
‘Uyimbube, uyimbube,’ but to Pete it sounded like awimboowee, or maybe awimoweh,
so that’s how he wrote it down.”).
11
See A Lion’s Trail, supra note 1.
12
See, e.g., Malan, supra note 7 (“‘Wimoweh’ lived on, bewitching jazz ace Jimmy
Dorsey, who covered it in 1952, and the sultry Yma Sumac, whose cocktail-lounge
version caused a minor stir a few years later. Toward the end of the decade, it was
included on Live From the Hungry I, a monstrously popular LP by the Kingston Trio that
stayed on the charts for more than three years (178 weeks), peaking at Number Two. By
now, almost everyone in America knew the basic refrain . . . .”).
13
A Lion’s Trail, supra note 1; Malan, supra note 7 (“George Weiss took ‘Wimoweh’
home with him and gave it a careful listen . . . . [E]veryone agrees . . . that: ‘The Lion
Sleeps Tonight’ was a reworking of ‘Wimoweh,’ which was a copy of ‘Mbube.’
Solomon Linda was buried under several layers of pop-rock stylings, but you could still
see him beneath the new song’s slick surface . . . .”).
14
Malan, supra note 7.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
A Lion’s Trail, supra note 1; see also Malan, supra note 7. Malan wrote:
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Mbube and its subsequent covers were so popular that
approximately “[one hundred and fifty] artists eventually recorded
the song.”18 It was “translated into languages from Dutch to
Japanese,” and was featured “in more than [thirteen] movies.”19
Linda “should have been a rich man.”20 Instead, he lived in a hut
in the Soweto section of Johannesburg with no furniture, “sleeping
on a dirt floor carpeted with cow dung.”21 His payment? In 1952,
upon signing over the rights to the company that produced his
record, “Linda received ten shillings—about eighty-seven cents
today.”22 He “also got a job sweeping floors and serving tea in the
company’s packing house.”23 In 1962, the same year that The
Tokens’ The Lion Sleeps Tonight became an international number
one hit, a desperately impoverished Solomon Linda died from
The song broke out regionally, hit the national charts in
November and reached Number One in four giant strides.
Within a month, a cover by someone named Karl Denver
reached Number One in England, too. By April 1962 it was topping
the charts almost everywhere and heading for immortality. Miriam
Makeba sang her version at JFK’s last birthday party, moments
before Marilyn Monroe famously lisped, “Happy birthday, Mr.
President.” Apollo astronauts listened to it on the launchpads at Cape
Canaveral, Florida. It was covered by the Springfields, the Spinners,
the Tremeloes and Glen Campbell. In 1972 it returned to the charts,
at Number Three, in a version by Robert John. Brian Eno recorded it
a few years later.
In 1982 it was back at Number One in the U.K., this time
performed by Tight Fit. R.E.M. did it, as did the Nylons and They
Might Be Giants. Manu Dibango did a twist version. Some Germans
turned it into heavy metal. A sample cropped up on a rap epic titled
“Mash Up da Nation.” Disney used the song in The Lion King, and
then it got into the smash-hit theatrical production of the same title,
currently playing to packed houses around the world. It’s on the
original Broadway cast recording, on dozens of kiddie CDs with
cuddly lions on their covers and on an infinite variety of nostalgia
compilations. It’s more than sixty years old, and still it’s everywhere.
Id. To hear a clip from The Tokens’ The Lion Sleeps Tonight, see Wikipedia, The Lion
Sleeps Tonight, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Lion_Sleeps_Tonight (last visited Oct.
21, 2009).
18
LaFraniere, supra note 2.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
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kidney disease at the age of fifty-three with less than twenty-five
dollars to his name.24
Solomon Linda’s story is just one example of Western
exploitation of traditional African music. The issue of protecting
traditional musical expressions in Africa encompasses much of the
cultural debate in the international community.25 Protecting
traditional African songs under statutory-only copyright schemes
has benefits, but more often than not, as exemplified in the case of
Solomon Linda, a purely statutory scheme is desperately
inadequate to protect the rights of traditional African songwriters
and performers.26 The Western and African traditions are
incompatible at a very basic level, and a system that would mesh
the two would be unfair and possibly destructive to traditional
African communities.27
This Note explores the protections given to traditional African
musicians and to the songs themselves under two very different
schemes: customary law and Western statutory law. In Part I, the
basic structure of both Western copyright and customary law
systems is explained; this part also contains a cursory explanation
of how customary law functions within Western courts set up
under the colonial system. The statutory schemes available in
different African countries, as well as several proposed
international solutions, are also explored in Part I. Part II discusses
the problems arising under customary law and statutory schemes,
respectively, when copyright of traditional music is the issue at
hand. Part III proposes a first-step solution to the problem of
protecting traditional songs and the musicians who perform them
by way of streamlining the court system and increasing judges’
education.

24

Id.; A Lion’s Trail, supra note 1.
See generally Michael Blakeney, Protecting Traditional Cultural Expressions: The
International Dimension, in 3 NEW DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 3, 3 (Fiona Macmillan
& Kathy Bowrey eds., 2006); Paul Kuruk, Protecting Folklore Under Modern
Intellectual Property Regimes: A Reappraisal of the Tensions Between Individual and
Communal Rights in Africa and the United States, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 769, 773–74
(1999).
26
See Kuruk, supra note 25, at 791–94.
27
See infra notes 194–96 and accompanying text.
25
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The solution would employ greater education for judges, an
expansion of the customary law judicial system within the statutecreated court system, and deference to the customary laws of
particular jurisdictions. The only way to achieve equality between
the customary law system and the statutory system is to recognize
that customary law is in and of itself a legitimate system worthy of
judicial enforcement, side-by-side with a statutory scheme.
I. OVERVIEW OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTIONS: WESTERN VS. AFRICAN
A. Western Copyright (Statutory-Based Schemes)
Before comparing Western copyrights with existing African
customary law, it is necessary to lay out the basic foundations
that are common to virtually all Western copyright schemes. It
is important to keep in mind that this Note deals with the
relationship between the oft-conflicting statutory and customary
law systems in Africa; for this reason, African statutory law,
which comes from the time of European colonization,28 can be
referred to as a “Western” scheme of law. In virtually every
Western scheme, there is a set of doctrines that have a common
thread: the requirements of fixation and originality, the idea
that an author owns his own work, and the principle that an idea
cannot be copyrighted.29
The fixation requirement, sometimes referred to as the
tangible form requirement, ensures that the work can be
perceived from the creation.30 Most Western statutory schemes
require that a work be fixed in a “definite medium of
expression,” from which the work can be perceived or known.31

28

See infra note 98 and text accompanying note 100.
E.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with
this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”).
30
See id.
31
E.g., Ghana, Copyright Act of 2005, § 1(2)(b) (enacted May 17, 2005); Nigerian
Copyright Act, (1999) Cap. 68, § 1(2)(b) (Nigeria).
29
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This requirement is necessary to ensure that the copyright is
given to a work that is more than fleeting.
The second requirement, which is notoriously difficult to
parse, is the requirement of originality. Virtually all copyright
statutes require originality.32 The originality requirement
forces the author to give some minimal degree of creativity (the
degree to which creativity must be established can differ
between countries).33
The third aspect of statutory copyright law that is common
to most African countries is the way that ownership is
determined. Under statutory schemes, ownership of any given
copyright usually belongs to the author, co-author, or joint
author of any of the included categories of works.34 The
statutory schemes do not allow group ownership, although most
of these countries do allow for works made for hire, whereby
the commissioning party would own the copyright.35
Finally, an aspect shared by most Western statutory
schemes is that an idea cannot be copyrighted.36 Rather,
copyright applies only to those works whose expressions have
been made tangible by an original, creative process.37

32

E.g., Ghana, Copyright Act of 2005, § 1(2)(a) (enacted May 17, 2005); Nigerian
Copyright Act, (1999) Cap. 68, § 1(2)(a) (Nigeria).
33
See Nigerian Copyright Act, (1999) Cap. 68, § 1(2)(a) (Nigeria) (noting that
“sufficient effort” must be expended to ensure the work’s originality).
34
E.g., Ghana, Copyright Act of 2005, § 1(1) (enacted May 17, 2005); Nigerian
Copyright Act, (1999) Cap. 68, § 9(1) (Nigeria); South African Copyright Act 125 of
1992 s. 21(1)(a).
35
E.g., Ghana, Copyright Act of 2005, § 7 (enacted May 17, 2005) (“In the absence of
any contract to the contrary, the economic right of a work shall vest in an employer or a
person who commissions the work where the employed or commissioned author has
created the work in the course of the employment or commission.” (emphasis added));
Nigerian Copyright Act, (1999) Cap. 68, § 9(3) (Nigeria).
36
E.g., Ghana, Copyright Act of 2005, § 2 (enacted May 17, 2005) (“Copyright shall
not extend to ideas, concepts, procedures, methods or other things of a similar nature.”);
Ghana, Copyright Law of 1985, § 3 (enacted Mar. 21, 1985).
37
E.g., Nigerian Copyright Act, (1999) Cap. 68, § 1(2)(a) (Nigeria); South African
Copyright Act 125 of 1992 s. 2(1). Ghana, South Africa and Nigeria have been provided
as examples but are representative of the various statutory schemes existing in Africa. To
avoid cluttering the footnotes with needless repetition, this Note will rely on those
countries to provide statutory examples.

C05_WASSEL_NOTE_123009_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

296

12/30/2009 11:13:37 AM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 20:289

B. Customary Law and African Culture
1. Background on Customary Law
Customary law can be a concept foreign to those trained in the
Western tradition, and therefore, to understand the traditional
concept of intellectual property within African traditions, it is
necessary to provide an overview of the nature and role of musical
composition as well as the relevant principles of customary law.
In much of sub-Saharan Africa, most people “belong to tribes
and have roots in traditional communities, [regardless of] whether
they live in villages or cities.”38 These traditional roots influence
much of their day-to-day lives, including particular rituals that may
be performed.39
One of the ubiquitous forms of expression common to many
African cultures is music.40 Musical performance often involves
“singing, humming, strumming strings, shaking rattles, beating
drums, or ringing bells and gongs.”41 The line between speech and
music is indistinct in many performance cultures, and music is
used for a variety of purposes, including both entertainment and
conveying information.42 Folksongs are often used in a social
context to build and enforce socially acceptable character.43
Music also “serves as a means of recording history by
preserving information about . . . past events.”44 For example,
“[i]n the Republic of Benin, there are special songs sung when a
child cuts [his] first teeth;”45 “among the Hausas of Nigeria, young
people . . . [use songs] to help them court lovers or insult rivals,”46
38

Kuruk, supra note 25, at 841.
See id. at 780.
40
See id.; see also Bernard J. Hibbitts, “Coming to Our Senses”: Communication and
Legal Expression in Performance Cultures, 41 EMORY L.J. 873, 893 (1992).
41
Hibbitts, supra note 40, at 893 (citing IDISORE OKPEWHO, THE EPIC IN AFRICA 62–63
(1979)).
42
See id.; Kuruk, supra note 25, at 780.
43
See Kuruk, supra note 25, at 780 (citing JOHN ROSCOE, THE BAGANDA: AN
ACCOUNT OF THEIR NATIVE CUSTOMS AND BELIEFS 460 (1965)).
44
Id.
45
Hibbitts, supra note 40, at 894 (quoting JOHN M. CHERNOFF, AFRICAN RHYTHM AND
AFRICAN SENSIBILITY 34 (1979)).
46
Id. (quoting CHERNOFF, supra note 45, at 34).
39
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and “men working in a field may . . . appoint some of their number
to work by making music instead of [farming];”47 and “among the
Hutus, men paddling a canoe will sing a different song depending
on whether they are going with or against the current.”48
Although some practices, to be discussed later,49 are quite
different from the Western intellectual property tradition as
exemplified in statutory schemes, African customary law does
afford some degree of protection for intellectual property rights.50
For example, only certain people are allowed to perform some
musical rites, use certain instruments, or sing certain songs; very
specific rules “govern who can . . . play certain musical
instruments, and at what time and for what reasons they are
played.”51 In fact, “the absence of a modern intellectual property
system” does not prevent an individual from seeking protection;52
protection is not achieved with a formal system, but rather, through
a universal understanding of social norms.53 At the very basic
level, intellectual property rights are protected by traditional

47

Id. (quoting CHERNOFF, supra note 45, at 34).
Id. (quoting CHERNOFF, supra note 45, at 34); see also LEONARD W. DOOB,
COMMUNICATION IN AFRICA: A SEARCH FOR BOUNDARIES 79 (1961). For a further
discussion of the culture and specific examples of the practices of Nigerians, see SABURI
OLADENI BIOBAKU, A WINDOW ON NIGERIA 19–29 (1994).
49
See infra Part I.C.1.
50
Johanna Gibson, Community and the Exhaustion of Culture: Creative Territories in
Traditional Cultural Expressions, in 3 NEW DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 15, 22 (Fiona
Macmillan & Kathy Bowrey eds., 2007).
51
Kuruk, supra note 25, at 784 (citing ROSCOE, supra note 43, at 189). Further
discussing these rules, Kuruk wrote:
[T]he great national drums of the Lozi which are beaten only for war,
or in national emergencies, are under the watchful eye of a special
council of elders. Each Baganda king in Uganda has a select group of
drummers who play special drums to ensure the permanency of his
office. Among the Bahima of Uganda, only women keep harps,
which they use at home. Among the Baganda, fifes are owned and
played mainly by herd boys. In Nigeria, certain musical instruments
are dedicated to particular cults.
Id.
52
BANKOLE SODIPO, PIRACY AND COUNTERFEITING: GATT, TRIPS, AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 42, 47 (1997).
53
See Kuruk, supra note 25, at 780–81.
48
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African tribal members’ deference to the customs and traditions of
their respective groups.54
Individuals living within traditional tribes have historically
enforced these rights in a variety of ways.55 Two kinds of laws
generally govern this area: royal decrees and taboos.56 The king,
who is regarded as a “sacred person[] representing the gods of the
people of the earth,” makes royal decrees,57 which carry the force
of secular law, albeit with a certain magical undertone.58 The
kings or chiefs have “moral and ritual authority based on a
perceived mystical association with the tribes’ ancestors.”59
These “rights are recognized under social criteria depending
upon the degree of the kinship, age, sex, title, or role of individuals
in the society . . . .”60 The norms are quite strictly enforced: it is
inconceivable that anyone outside the socially acceptable group
having these rights would engage in singing its songs.61 This is
particularly true of different age groups: “members of an age group
would never sing the songs . . . of another age group.”62 These
norms are enforced by sanctions based on common interests.63
Sanctions, which are “often determined by the leaders of the
constituent groups, can range from censure, to fines, to ostracism,
or even expulsion from the group.”64
54

Id. at 782–84.
See SODIPO, supra note 52, at 42.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
See Kuruk, supra note 25, at 781.
59
Id. at 781–82 (citing ELIZABETH COLSON & MAX GLUCKMAN, SEVEN TRIBES OF
BRITISH CENTRAL AFRICA 169 (1968)).
60
Kuruk, supra note 25, at 780–81.
61
See SODIPO, supra note 52, at 44, 46.
62
Id. at 44.
63
Kuruk, supra note 25, at 785.
64
Id. at 786. See generally SODIPO, supra note 52, at 43–44 (“The breach of a tradition
could be punished by the head of the family, or clan, or by members of an age group.
Erring members could be disciplined by the head of the larger family, who might order a
fine of items like local gin, goats, etc., or a sacrifice. Pressure would be brought to bear
on any offender who failed to pay his fine or who repeated the offen[s]e. His wife would
plead with him to avoid the long-term repercussions (bad luck) which would ensue for his
immediate family. The offender’s wife would be coerced by members of her original
larger family to press her husband to conform. Other members of the larger family might
also coerce an offender into paying his fines, to avoid repercussions on their family.
55
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Royal decrees and taboos are related forms; the royal decrees,
made by a human king, often can be supported or carried out by
magical or spiritual consequences, known as taboos.65 Taboos are
superstitious beliefs that “certain objects and persons are set aside
as sacred or accursed.”66 Because cultural norms are engendered
with mystical connotations,67 failure to observe these norms
“brings the anger and curses of the gods against the offender or
even against the whole community,”68 and accordingly, a taboo
will be placed on the offender or the whole community.69 Taboos
can result in severe penalties.70
Tribal intellectual property rights are absolutely binding; the
sanction for violating these rights often takes the form of magical
or spiritual punishments by tribal ancestors.71 These sanctions
derive their enforcement power from “the common ritual
dependence of members of the lineage on their ancestors.”72 If
tribal rights are violated, it is believed that the gods will enforce
these rights.73 Therefore, even though a Western statutory scheme
is not in place in a way that can be easily enforced by tribal
members, traditional African tribes still afford some degree of
protection of intellectual property rights.

Further disobedience could lead to the family being ostracized by the larger family, or by
the entire community. This was often the worst kind of punishment. The community
would not buy from him or sell to him or members of his immediate family. If he was
still obdurate (depending on the offen[s]e), he could either be banished from the
community or he would leave of his own accord because he would not be able to bear the
shame. Such exit usually must be for a distant community—neighbo[]ring communities
would probably know that the newcomer was an offender from another community. He
would then be seen either as bringing ill luck, or as a danger to the new community since
he might be disobedient and cause an upset in the new community.”).
65
See Kuruk, supra note 25, at 785–86.
66
Id. at 849 n.112 (quoting MASON BEGHO, LAW AND CULTURE IN THE NIGERIAN AND
ROMAN WORLD 99 (1971)).
67
Id. at 785.
68
Id. at 849 n.112 (quoting BEGHO, supra note 66, at 99).
69
Id.
70
Id. at 785–86.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 785.
73
Id. at 785–86, 849 n.112.
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2. Differences Between African and Western IP Ideology
Although customary norms provide a certain degree of IP
protection, there are, of course, major differences between African
and Western traditions, particularly with regard to the form,
purpose, and ownership of the music itself.74 For example,
traditional African songs are often not fixed in tangible form,
instead remaining ephemeral, fleeting, and in a constant state of
change.75 These songs are still protected under a system of social
norms and magical beliefs.76
Another major difference is that the purpose of cultural
property in African society is different than in Western music.77
Aside from its value as entertainment:
Music serve[s] as a medium for recording
history . . . play[s] a vital role in rituals and
festivities . . . serve[s] as a medium for communing
with dead ancestors and spirits; as a palliative in
healing mental or physical illnesses by preparing
the mind for healing acts; to provoke riots, or
prepare for fights and battles; and as social
commentary, to criticize or check abuse of
government.78
At the heart of this difference is that the intent of the African
creator departs from a Western ideal.79 To Africans, the value of
music cannot simply be commoditization—buying and selling in
the marketplace.80 As has previously been discussed, the intent of
creating music may not be for the pure enjoyment of the music
itself, but rather, to serve a specific societal purpose.81

74

See infra notes 75–87 and accompanying text.
See Hibbitts, supra note 40, at 951.
76
See supra Part I.B.1.
77
See Hibbitts, supra note 40, at 893.
78
SODIPO, supra note 52, at 38; see also BIOBAKU, supra note 48, at 22 (“The songs,
ancient and modern, are rich in their use of language; they weave social events, long ago
and of today, in their lyrics . . . .”).
79
See Hibbitts, supra note 40, at 894.
80
See id.
81
See id. (“In [N]orth African Siwan society, for instance, the air may be filled with
the ritual wailing of bereaved relatives. This is not an immature ‘noise,’ an aural
75
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Another major difference between customary law and Western
IP schemes is that, under customary law, ownership of traditional
practices, including music, “refers to the rights of all members of
the community in subject-matter originally acquired by ancestors
which cannot be transferred unilaterally by any member of the
group.”82 There is no real Western corollary to the group
ownership that exists in African tribes; this idea that there is ‘“an
intermediary sphere of intellectual property rights between
individual rights and the . . . public domain’”83 is simply foreign to
the Western tradition.84 Within traditional communities, however,
it makes perfect sense:
[T]raditional communities inhere in the prior
stability of ancestral tradition, and the responsibility
to narrate tradition and therefore maintain the
“self”-expression of community according to shared
“values”. This tradition may not be personali[z]ed
or “owned” as such, but must be expressed and
maintained.
It is this responsibility to tradition that founds
the legitimacy of community resources . . . .85
Responsibility to tradition makes property communal, or at the
very least, “resistant to quantification;” this is achieved by social
context where the tribe’s common belief in the pervasion of the

nuisance, or an inconvenience. It is, instead, a useful manner of communicating a death
over a wide geographic area.”).
82
Kuruk, supra note 25, at 794; see Joost Smiers, The Abolition of Copyrights: Better
for Artists, Third World Countries and the Public Domain, in COPYRIGHT IN THE
CULTURAL INDUSTRIES 119, 128 (Ruth Towse ed., 2002) [hereinafter Smiers, The
Abolition of Copyrights].
83
Smiers, The Abolition of Copyrights, supra note 82, at 128.
84
There are, of course, quasi-indigenous groups based in the Western tradition who
may have a similar problem with the intellectual property rights of their ever-changing
cultural property. See generally id. at 126–29. Additionally, there are groups around the
world whose intellectual property differences mirror those of the African tribes. See id. at
126–28. However, the scope of this Note is limited to the issues surrounding the IP
problems in African tribal music.
85
Gibson, supra note 50, at 19.
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sacred or the spiritual extends to all members of the community.86
Cultural expression is considered a community resource; it is, at a
very basic level, a rejection of the idea of the separation of
community and its resources.87
This collective ownership derives from a different musical
aesthetic. In traditional societies, ‘“the responsibility for a
narrative is never assumed by a person, but by a mediator, shaman
or relater whose ‘performance’—the mastery of the narrative
code—may possibly be admired but never his ‘genius.’”88 Only in
the modern Western tradition is an author accorded individual
prestige rather than crediting the group as a whole.89 This Western
idea is best summed up in the words of James Fenimore Cooper:
“All greatness of character is depend[e]nt on individuality. The
man who has no other existence than that which he partakes in
common with all around him, will never have any other than an
existence of mediocrity.”90
However, in many parts of the world, music and other artistic
creations belong to a process of changing and adapting, and thus
belong to the commons.91 In Africa, even the process of creating
music is not done by a single individual, but rather, is shared by
the community as a whole.92 This is seen as a community-building
and strengthening exercise which is vital to the very structure of
the tribe itself.93

86

Peter Fitzpatrick & Richard Joyce, Copying Right: Cultural Property and the Limits
of (Occidental) Law, in 4 NEW DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 171, 175 (Fiona
Macmillan ed., 2007).
87
See Gibson, supra note 50, at 29–32.
88
Smiers, The Abolition of Copyrights, supra note 82, at 124 (quoting K.M. NEWTON,
TWENTIETH-CENTURY LITERARY THEORY: A READER 155 (1988)).
89
See id. (citing NEWTON, supra note 88, at 155).
90
JAMES FENIMORE COOPER, THE AMERICAN DEMOCRAT & OTHER POLITICAL
WRITINGS 488 (Bradley J. Birzer & John Wilson eds., 2000).
91
See Joost Smiers, Creative Improper Property: Copyright and the Non-Western
World, in 1 NEW DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 3, 13 (Fiona Macmillan ed., 2005)
[hereinafter Smiers, Creative Improper Property].
92
Smiers, The Abolition of Copyrights, supra note 82, at 128 (‘“[I]n African
performing arts the audiences often have a creative role too, as they chant, clap and
perform dance-dialogues with the musicians.’”).
93
See African Activists Take the Stage at New York Performance Summit, N.Y.
AMSTERDAM NEWS, Oct. 27, 2005, at 20.
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It is important to note, however, that the members of the
community (or subgroup within the community) who create
traditional music do not have particular enforceable rights vis-à-vis
outsiders.94 For example, a Western intruder who wrongfully
appropriated tribal music would be unaffected by the royal decrees
or taboos, and thus, would have no incentive to follow those
societal traditions. While there are socially enforceable rules
governing the rights of members of the tribe against each other
(insiders against insiders), there are no enforceable customary laws
that protect members of the tribe against nonmember appropriation
of tribal music (insiders against outsiders).95 These outsiders can,
and often do, appropriate traditional music without fear of
retribution.96
3. Customary Law in the Courts
In order to understand the root of the issue this Note seeks to
explore, it is necessary to briefly describe how the customary law
system functions within the Western-style court system in most
African countries.97
Most African countries did not recognize customary law as a
legitimate legal system until very recently.98 Before that, countries
94

See Gibson, supra note 50, at 32.
This is because, quite simply, a Western-thinking individual would not believe in the
taboos and royal decrees that bind traditional African peoples. An atheist does not fear
the wrath of God because he does not believe in a higher power, but a religious person
would have that deity-based fear in his heart. Such is the case with Westerners and
African tribes. See Kuruk, supra note 25, at 786–87.
96
See infra Part II.A.
97
There are customary law courts that deal specifically and only with customary law,
but for the purposes of this section, only Western-style courts will be discussed, as they
would be the courts hearing copyright cases with Westerners. The legal authority of
these courts was solidified in the case of Mdumane v. Mtshakule, 1948 N.A.C 28 (C&O)
(Bizana) (S. Afr.). D.S. Koyana, Traditional Courts in the 21st Century 2 (Leitner Center
for Int’l Law & Justice). Furthermore, “[t]raditional courts are not courts of record as
such. All proceedings are conducted orally in the language most widely spoken in the
area of jurisdiction of the court.” Id. at 7.
98
See, e.g., T.W. BENNETT, CUSTOMARY LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 34 (2004) (“Until the
advent of a new constitution in 1993, customary law had never been fully recognized as a
basic component of the South African legal system. Instead, Roman-Dutch law was
treated as the common law of the land.”). In 1988, South Africa promulgated the Law of
Evidence Amendment Act, which “made customary law applicable in any court in the
95
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like South Africa stated that the courts “could apply customary
law, except in so far as it was ‘not repugnant to the general
principles of humanity observed throughout the civilized world.’”99
In the early twentieth century, many traditional courts, which
applied customary law, were subordinate to commissioners’ courts,
which applied Western colonial law; this meant that Westerners
could hear appeals from customary law disputes.100
Today, African courts may apply either Western law or
customary law, depending upon the facts of the case before the
court.101
C. Statutory Protections: African and International
Many African states have adopted national intellectual property
schemes that attempt to accommodate traditional African
conceptions of intellectual property in addition to Western
statutory schemes.102 Additionally, there are several international
approaches which have been developed to accommodate
internationally differing conceptions of intellectual property.103
This section reviews such schemes.104
country.” Id. at 42. This obligation to apply customary law where necessary is qualified
by three restrictions: “that customary law is ‘applicable,’ that it is compatible with the
Constitution and that it has not been superseded by ‘any legislation that specifically deals
with customary law.’” Id. at 43.
99
Id. at 38.
100
See id. at 40.
101
Id. at 49–51.
102
See infra Part I.C.2.
103
See infra Part I.C.2.
104
It is important to keep in mind that when speaking of African tradition from a
Western perspective, it is inherently a view of primal fixitythe idea of the primitive
who must be protected from the invasiveness of the Western world. See Fitzpatrick &
Joyce, supra note 86, at 175. Essentially, when we speak about primal fixity, it is the
idea that the African tribe member has always performed his custom in the manner in
which the Westerner presently observes. See id. However, this is likely not the case
because African traditions are so fluid and constantly change over time. See id. at 174.
Therefore, the view of African traditions must necessarily be a paternalistic one if viewed
from the Western perspective. See id. at 174–75. Primal fixity is a concept which
controls much of how Westerners view copyright protections; it is inherently rooted in
Western individualism and centers around the idea that once something is created, it
exists forever and does not changehence the aforementioned view of African culture as
fixed in a certain, ever-present and always repeated tradition. See id. The concept of a
changing, living, and breathing African musical culture cannot fit into a view of primal
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The Western tradition dictates that every artist who has created
or performed something must take care to protect his work from
wrongful misappropriation and must take care that the work will
demonstrably receive copyright status after the creation or
performance.105 Indeed, in multilateral agreements like TRIPs106
(Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, from the World Trade Organization), “poor and developing
countries have been pushed” to introduce a system of intellectual
property that would offer individuals copyright protection in
cultural works.107
1. International Schemes
Cultural identity is protected in Article 27 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.108 Additionally, the

fixity, and therefore, it must be subordinate to the Western view. See generally IP
JUSTICE, IP JUSTICE POLICY PAPER FOR THE WIPO DEVELOPMENT AGENDA (2005),
http://ipjustice.org/WIPO/WIPO_DA_IP_Justice_Policy_Paper.shtml (“IP systems need
to take into account different levels of national development to ensure that the underlying
policies that IP seeks to promote are ultimately met. Both developed and developing
countries support this proposition, but some developed countries try to impose a
particular view of intellectual property on all, while disregarding history in which today’s
‘rich’ countries became wealthy to a certain extent by refusing to recognize intellectual
property and by granting wider exceptions and limitations to copyright.”).
105
See Gibson, supra note 50, at 21.
106
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 40, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
33 I.L.M. 1197, 1213 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
107
See Smiers, Creative Improper Property, supra note 91, at 5. For example, the
TRIPS Agreement speaks directly to individual ownership; however, it leaves out any
mention of group ownership. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 104, at art. 16. This is a
concept being foisted upon poor and developing countries that may not have as
sophisticated an IP system as Western countries. See Smiers, Creative Improper
Property, supra note 91, at 5. This causes the developing countries to try to conform
their wealth of intellectual property to a Western system that may not be the best fit. Id.;
see TRIPS Agreement, supra note 104, at art. 13 (“Members shall confine limitations or
exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
right holder.”).
108
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 27, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; see also Yvonne Mokgoro, The Protection of Cultural
Identity in the Constitution and the Creation of National Unity in South Africa: A
Contradiction in Terms?, 52 SMU L. REV. 1549, 1550 (1999) (“‘[P]ersons belonging to .
. . minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of their
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Universal Copyright Convention (“UCC”), held in 1952 by the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(“UNESCO”), “provided that the existence of a copyright notice
was sufficient of subsistence of copyright in member states.”109
The UCC protection, however, pre-supposed that there was
copyright protection in the first country in order to transfer that
right across international borders.110 Quite obviously, if the
country of origin does not give copyright protection to the author
originally, then there will be no copyright protections to transfer to
a new country.111 The UCC was an attempt to broaden the
international protections of copyright, but kept mainly to a
statutory scheme because “copyright notice” does not exist in
customary law in the traditional sense.112
In 1985, UNESCO and the World Intellectual Property
Organization (“WIPO”) adopted a resolution based on the Model
Provisions for National Law on the Protection of Expressions of
Folklore Against Illicit Exploitation and Other Prejudicial
Action,113 promulgated by the Committee of Governmental Experts
on the Intellectual Property Aspects of the Protection of
Expressions of Folklore (convened in 1980).114 The Model
Provisions use the terms “expressions” or “productions” instead of
“works” as a distinction between its protection of folk songs and
ordinary copyright laws.115 The Provisions protect “‘characteristic

group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practi[c]e their own religion, or to use
their own language.’” (quoting ICCPR, supra, at art. 27)). Mokgoro notes that “South
Africa is a signatory to this Covenant.” Mokgoro, supra, at 1561 n.7.
109
SODIPO, supra note 52, at 22.
110
See id. at 22–23.
111
See id.
112
See id. at 21–22. Copyright notice is a Western tradition; in African tribes, because
of the group ownership dynamic, there is no need to notify anyone of the existence of an
individual right. When something is created, it belongs to the whole group, albeit
restricted to the appropriate age, rank, class, etc. See supra Part I.B.
113
Model Provisions for National Laws on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore
Against Illicit Exploitation and Other Prejudicial Actions, WIPO & UNESCO (1985),
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/documents/pdf/1982-folklore-model-provisions.pdf
[hereinafter Model Provisions].
114
Blakeney, supra note 25, at 5.
115
Kuruk, supra note 25, at 815 (citing Farhana Yamin & Darrell Addison Posey,
Indigenous Peoples, Biotechnology and Intellectual Property Rights, 2 REV. EUR.
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elements of the traditional artistic heritage developed and
maintained by a community.’”116 Protection exists whether the art
“is expressed verbally, musically, by action, or in tangible
form.”117
The Model Provisions were another attempt to broaden
copyright protections by defining a new class of community
artistic works subsumed under the heading of folklore. There are
two problems with the Model Provisions, however. First, they
“avoid the concept of ownership.”118 The Model Provisions offer
protection only to those “productions consisting of characteristic
elements of the traditional artistic heritage developed and
maintained by a community of (name of the country) or by
individuals reflecting the traditional artistic expectations of such a
community,”119 a concept which offers no concrete idea of who
might actually be the owner of any work. Second, the Model
Provisions’ useful features are legally and practically insignificant
because they have not been adopted by any country.120
In 2001, UNESCO adopted the Universal Declaration on
Cultural Diversity,121 which states that “culture should be regarded
as the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and
emotional features of society or a social group, and that it
encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of
living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs.”122 The
Declaration puts a particular emphasis on the diversity of creative

COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 141, 145 (1993)); see Model Provisions, supra note 113,
§ 2.
116
Kuruk, supra note 25, at 815 (quoting Model Provisions, supra note 113, § 2).
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
See Model Provisions, supra note 113, § 2.
120
Kuruk, supra note 25, at 817 (citing Darrell Addison Posey, International
Agreements and Intellectual Property Right Protection for Indigenous Peoples, in 3–4
IPR: A CURRENT SURVEY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES:
A SOURCEBOOK 223, 231 (Tom Greaves ed., 1994)).
121
UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, UNESCO Doc. 31C/Res 25,
Annex 1 (Nov. 2, 2001), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001271/
127160m.pdf [hereinafter UNESCO Declaration].
122
Id. at pmbl.
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works, and urges that the rights of artists should be respected;123 it
also states that cultural goods and services have “vectors of
identity, values, and meaning” and must not be treated as mere
commodities or consumer goods.124
The Declaration goes on to state that “cultural policies must
create conditions conducive to the production and dissemination of
diversified cultural goods and services through cultural industries
that have the means to assert themselves at the local and global
level,”125 but it does not lay out any specific guidelines for how
each state should define its cultural policy,126 instead leaving it to
the individual country to implement its own policies through
whatever “means it considers fit.”127 These guidelines serve to
promote cultural diversity and to encourage states to be more
inclusive in their own statutory schemes, rather than promoting one
type of scheme over another.128 The Declaration is an attempt to
garner acceptance for cultural intellectual property forms and to
afford them the same protection given to traditional Western forms
of culture.129
2. National Schemes
A brief discussion of individual African countries’ schemes for
copyright protection reveals an effort by African states to
accommodate both traditional conceptions of property in music
and Western intellectual property protection.130 For example, in
South Africa, the Bill of Rights “recogni[z]es that people
belonging to a cultural . . . community may not be denied the right
to enjoy their culture . . . .”131 The South African Bill of Rights
123

Id. at art. 9 (“While ensuring the free circulation of ideas and works, cultural
policies must create conditions conducive to the production and dissemination of
diversified cultural goods and services through cultural industries that have the means to
assert themselves at the local and global level.”).
124
Id. at art. 8.
125
Id. at art. 9.
126
See id. at art. 12.
127
Id. at art. 9.
128
See id. at Action Plan §§ 16, 18, 19.
129
See UNESCO Declaration, supra note 121.
130
See infra notes 131–52 and accompanying text.
131
Mokgoro, supra note 108, at 1556 (citing S. AFR. CONST. 1996 §§ 30–31).
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aims to “forge a common value system for a national consensus,”
presumably to blur the line between customary law and statutory
law.132 But the South African Constitution itself recognizes the
“status and role of traditional leadership”133 and states that the
courts are obligated to apply customary law when applicable.134
This creates a pluralist system of law, where the law applied in any
given case may be either customary or statutory.135
In Nigeria, the Copyright Act protects expressions of
folklore.136
Additionally, the Act protects music and
performances.137 The Act offers protection against unauthorized
“reproduction . . . communication to the public by performance . . .
[or] adaptations” where the expressions are “made . . . for
commercial purposes or outside their traditional or customary
context.”138 Nigeria has a very inclusive scheme for protection of
traditional music because it attempts to circumvent the problems
with tangible form and ownership requirements to which many
other countries rigidly adhere.139 Thus, Nigerian copyright
protection eschews many of the traditional qualities a work must
have before protection is allowed.140
In contrast, Ghana’s scheme makes little effort to get around
the tangible form and originality requirements that are so
problematic in traditional tribal culture.141 In Ghana’s Copyright
Act, which has a much less flexible framework, “the work must be
original, in writing, or otherwise reduced to material form” to

132

Id. at 1557.
S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 211(1).
134
Id. § 211(3).
135
See id. § 211.
136
Copyright Act, (1990) Cap. 68, § 28(5) (Nigeria) (“[F]olklore means a grouporiented and tradition-based creation of groups or individuals reflecting the expectation
of the community as an adequate expression of its cultural and social identity, its
standards and values as transmitted orally, by imitation or by other means including—(b)
folk songs and instrumental folk music . . . .”).
137
Id. § 23.
138
Id. § 28(1)(a)–(c).
139
See id. § 28.
140
For a discussion of these qualities, see supra Part I.A.
141
See infra notes 142–45 and accompanying text.
133
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garner copyright protection.142 Ghanaian law also requires that the
work is created by a citizen or resident of Ghana, if first published
in Ghana,143 “or if first published outside Ghana, [is] published in
Ghana within thirty days of its publication outside Ghana.”144 As
for folklore protection, the copyrights of authors of folklore vest
“in the [government] as if the [government] were the creator of the
works.”145
In most African countries, folklore is seen as part of the
national heritage. In Cameroon, “work based on . . . ideas
borrowed from traditional cultural heritage of the country is
protected under copyright law.”146 Additionally, “Congolese
copyright law protects folklore without a time limitation . . . . [and]
a [special] society known as the ‘Body of Authors’ is responsible
for collecting royalties, representing the interests of authors, and
overseeing the use of folklore,”147 as well as giving permission for
any performance or reproduction.148
Mali has a similar system, in which “folklore is also considered
part of the country’s heritage,” and anyone wishing to use a folk
song for profit must contact the Minister of Arts and Culture.149
Besides for-profit uses of folklore, all “‘works whose authors are
unknown, including the songs, legends, dances, and other
142

Ghana, Copyright Act of 2005, § 1(2)(a)–(b) (enacted May 17, 2005); see also
Kuruk, supra note 25, at 788.
143
Ghana, Copyright Act of 2005, § 1(2)(c)(i) (enacted May 17, 2005); see also Kuruk,
supra note 25, at 788.
144
Ghana, Copyright Act of 2005, § 1(2)(c)(ii) (enacted May 17, 2005); see also
Kuruk, supra note 25, at 788.
145
See Ghana, Copyright Law, (5)(2) (enacted Mar. 21, 1985) amended by Ghana,
Copyright Act of 2005, § (4)(2) (enacted May 17, 2005).
146
Kuruk, supra note 25, at 802 (citing Law No. 82-18 to Regulate Copyright
(Cameroon) art. 6(c) (1982), reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT: MONTHLY REV. WORLD INTELL.
PROP. ORG. 201, 360, 360–61 (1983)); id. at 802 n.242.
147
Id. at 800 (citing Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights (Congo) arts. 16, 68–69
(1982), reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT: MONTHLY REV. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 201,
201–02, 244 (1983)).
148
Id. (citing Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights (Congo) art. 18 (1982),
reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT: MONTHLY REV. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 201, 202
(1983)).
149
Id. at 801 (quoting Ordinance Concerning Literary and Artistic Property (Mali) art. 8
(July 1, 1977), reprinted in 16 COPYRIGHT: MONTHLY REV. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.
125, 180, 182 (1980)).
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manifestations of the common cultural heritage’”150 are placed in
the public domain and may include folklore; potential users must
pay a fee.151 Similarly, “[i]n the Central African Republic, the
Central African Copyright Office must authorize the commercial
[usage] of folklore.”152
By placing works in the public domain but leaving control with
the government, these countries create a central authority from
which people can gain permission to use copyrighted material.
This allows for greater access due to the ease with which all parties
can garner information about ownership and potential use, and
also, greater protection for the tribes who might not otherwise be
afforded the respect of having their permission sought.
II. INADEQUATE EITHER WAY: ISSUES IN PURE SCHEMES OF LAW
A. Problems: Copyright Protections Arising Under Customary
Law
A number of difficulties arise if a system of exclusively
customary law is used. Firstly, and perhaps most obviously,
extending intellectual property protections outside the tribe is
practically impossible, given that many of the sanctions imposed
under customary law for infringement make sense and are a
deterrent only to members of a particular tribe.153

150

Id. (quoting Ordinance Concerning Literary and Artistic Property (Mali) art. 8 (July
1, 1977), reprinted in 16 COPYRIGHT: MONTHLY REV. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 125,
180, 182 (1980)).
151
Id. at 801–02 (citing Ordinance Concerning Literary and Artistic Property (Mali) art.
8 (July 1, 1977), reprinted in 16 COPYRIGHT: MONTHLY REV. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.
125, 180, 182 (1980)). The statute authorizes the Ministers of Arts and Culture and of
Finance to charge fees for use of works deemed to be in the public domain. Id. Works
belonging “to the common cultural heritage,” or public domain, include works by
unknown authors, owners who waived copyright protection, foreign authors not residing
in Mali, deceased authors without heirs, and authors whose term of protection has
expired. Id.
152
Id. at 802 (citing Ordinance No. 85-002 on Copyright (Central African Republic)
arts. 9, 46 (Jan. 5, 1985), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT: MONTHLY REV. WORLD INTELL.
PROP. ORG. 158, 160 (1985)).
153
Id. at 786–87 (citing SODIPO, supra note 52, at 42).
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If sanctions are enforced by magical or religious beliefs, they
obviously only have power over those who subscribe to those
particular beliefs.154 If those sanctions are enforced by social
norms, then quite clearly only the members of that social group
would have the power to enforce those norms; similarly, only
members of that social group have incentive to avoid sanctions like
ostracism.155 To members of a particular tribe, these protections
are internally sufficient because they are reinforced by the very
social fabric of their tribe.156 These protections are not sufficient
to protect against the outside world, however, because outsiders
have no reason to follow these social norms.
Take, for example, the problem of Solomon Linda, whose
traditional work was appropriated by more than one outsider.157
Linda’s work may have been internally protected within his own
tribe in the Hinterlands, but once outsiders like Pete Seeger and
George Weiss found his music, they were able to appropriate it
without fear of retribution by angry tribal spirits.
A second problem arises with the concept of communal
ownership of music in African tribes, and this situation is
exceedingly common in traditional African tribes.158 It is unclear
exactly which rights this system confers on individuals outside the
tribe; neither does this system clarify who within the tribe could
have the power to give rights to individuals outside the group.159

154

For a discussion of these beliefs, see supra Part I.B.1.
See Kuruk, supra note 25, at 785–86. Customary law does not always encompass
problems associated with folklore:
Within the groups, there is pressure to recognize and respect the
rights and privileges associated with folklore in the common interests
of members of the community. Inherent in this system, however, is a
defect that may limit the usefulness of customary law in tackling the
problems of unauthorized uses. Since many of the individuals
engaged in the unauthorized use of folklore are foreigners, they may
not have the incentive to respect the norms in the interest of the
general community.
Id. at 786.
156
See id. at 785–86.
157
For history and details on this topic, see supra Introduction.
158
For a discussion of communal ownership, see supra Part I.B.1.
159
See Smiers, The Abolition of Copyrights, supra note 82, at 126–27 (“[Artists in
Third World countries] may be highly respected for what they have created. However,
155
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While chiefs or other members of the group may have authority to
perform the music, it is not clear who would serve as the authority
to grant permission for other types of use.160 This is a growing
problem due to a movement toward individualism within the tribes
themselves.161 Communal ownership creates problems, of course,
when trying to enforce these intellectual property rights outside of
the particular tribe.162
In some tribes, traditional “notions of collective ownership
have been contaminated by concepts of private ownership and of
production for profit”163 as tribal members realized there was
money to be made in cultural industries.164 This movement is
widespread and affects many countries;165 local artists take a
melody which originated from the collective tradition and use it
with the purpose of commercializing and commodifying that
music.166 These artists claim ownership, which enables exclusion
of others in rights to those cultural resources.167 It is in this
transformation from communal to individual that the concept of
copyright gets introduced because when an individual owns a

there is no concept in many cultures of an individual exploiting a creation or invention
monopolistically for many decades.”).
160
See Kuruk, supra note 25, at 783–87.
161
See id. at 787.
162
See SODIPO, supra note 52, at 49 (“Property in intangibles in pre-literate societies
was usually vested in the community as a whole, or the section of the community
concerned. This raises the question of the non-recognition of communal property in
intellectual property by the common and civil law. Communal onwership [sic] of real
property is recogni[z]ed in Nigeria. Unless attention is given by the international
community to the recognition of communal intellectual property ownership by the
modern system, similar rights in preliterate societies will be prejudiced.”).
163
Kuruk, supra note 25, at 787.
164
Id.; cf. Samuel K. B. Asante, Interests in Land in the Customary Law of Ghana—A
New Appraisal, 74 YALE L.J. 848, 857 (1965) (discussing evolving concepts of
ownership in response to social and economic changes).
165
Smiers, Creative Improper Property, supra note 91, at 14 (“Meanwhile, it happens
more and more in non-Western societies that local artists privately appropriate an artistic
idea . . . and start to use it for their own commercial interests . . . . What has been
described here in a nutshell covers huge social transformations taking place all over the
world.”).
166
Id. Solomon Linda may be taken as an example of this notion. In his case, he took a
traditional song and popularized it outside of his own tribal group, obviously with the
intent to distribute copies and to make some sort of profit. See supra Introduction.
167
Smiers, Creative Improper Property, supra note 91, at 14.
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copyright, he is necessarily owning the right to exclude others
from using the subject of the copyright.168
However, it is not entirely clear from whom these individuals
should be seeking permission to use traditional music. The
customary law system is effective in protecting against unfair use
in the traditional tribal context due to its social enforceability;
however, the customary system breaks down when individuals
within the tribe appropriate the music for their own commercial
use in society outside the tribe.169
Another problem posed by this scenario is how to tell insiders
from outsiders. That is, how to discern who is considered a tribal
member and who is a non-tribal member for the purposes of
protecting traditional musical cultural property. Does an insider
(i.e., a tribal member) automatically become an outsider when he
appropriates a traditional song and attempts to use it outside the
traditional context? Should that insider be considered as an
outsider or should he be treated differently than an actual Western
“outsider?” Automatically considering a tribal member to be an
“outsider” once he misappropriates a work is not necessarily an
undesirable occurrence for purposes of cultural exchange because
it simplifies the classification of individuals seeking to use tribal
music, but customary law as it stands does not have any
protections against it.170
Additionally, no customary rules exist with regard to non-tribe
members taking traditional tribal music and using it in a
commercial setting.171 That is, the customary law does not provide
168

Id.
This is, perhaps, due to the fact that the idea of individual gain from the group’s
property is relatively new. See Smiers, The Abolition of Copyrights, supra note 82, at
126–27 (“The individual appropriation of creations and inventions is a concept alien to
many cultures . . . there is no concept in many cultures of an individual exploiting a
creation or invention monopolistically for many decades.”).
170
This is necessarily true; customary law applies only to those members of the group
who follow their laws; there are no laws pertaining specifically to non-tribal members, or
members who break with tradition with no regard for the tribal customs, perhaps because
the tribes never contemplated that scenario. See Kuruk, supra note 25, at 786–87.
171
As has been discussed previously in this Note, Solomon Linda’s case is a good
example of this; Pete Seeger and George Weiss, among numerous others, appropriated
Linda’s music and used it to create world-wide hits. For further discussion, see supra
Introduction.
169

C05_WASSEL_NOTE_123009_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2009

12/30/2009 11:13:37 AM

AFRICAN FOLK MUSIC IN DUAL SYSTEMS OF LAW

315

for rules in a situation like Solomon Linda’s, where a Westerner
appropriates traditional African music. While there may be
statutory schemes in some countries that protect against this, no
customary scheme has this characteristic, probably because the
customary law system never contemplated this now increasingly
common scenario.172 This insider-versus-outsider problem poses a
significant threat to the safety and integrity of cultural property.173
Perhaps the most difficult problem that exists in a purely
customary scheme, however, is that of how non-traditional courts
should apply customary law. A cursory definition of customary
law is helpful, taken from a Ghanaian example:
Customary law, as comprised in the laws of Ghana,
consists of rules of law which by custom are
applicable to particular communities in Ghana, not
being rules included in the common law under any
enactment providing for the assimilation of such
rules of customary law as are suitable for general
application.174

172
See Smiers, Creative Improper Property, supra note 91, at 14 (“[I]t happens more
and more in non-Western societies that local artists privately appropriate an artistic idea,
a melody or a cultural development origination from the collective tradition, and start to
use it for their own commercial interests. They pretend it is theirs, which starts the
process of excluding others of those cultural resources. In this transformation the concept
of copyright gets introduced rather quickly.”).
173
For a cursory example, see supra Introduction for a discussion on Solomon Linda
and the perils of producing a popular, traditional song.
174
Gordon R. Woodman, Some Realism About Customary Law—The West African
Experience, 1969 WIS. L. REV. 128, 129 (quoting Interpretation Act (1960), Acts of
Ghana C.A. 4, § 18(1)(b)); see E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN: A
STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LEGAL DYNAMICS 18, 28 (1954) (“A social norm is legal if its
neglect or infraction is regularly met, in threat or in fact, by the application of physical
force by an individual or group possession the socially recognized privilege of so acting.”
(emphasis omitted)). But see Francis Snyder, Customary Law and the Economy, 28 J.
AFR. L. 34, 35 (1984) (“It was the product of European capital and the colonial state, but
was subsequently reified as the concept of ‘tradition.’ In this form the precolonial referent
was explicitly integrated into the ideologies of scholarship and politics. It formed an
essential part of the conventional contrast between the ‘traditional’ and the ‘modern,’
embodying both evolutionary and political presuppositions. Produced in the particular
historical circumstances, the notion of customary law was an ideology of colonial
domination.”).
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Customary law in most countries takes the form of rules that
the average person within the culture would regard as binding.175
What makes customary law binding is that it is “habitually obeyed
by those subject to it [because] if not fortified by established usage
it is not law.”176 While established usage may help the courts to
determine which law to apply, customary law remains uncodified
in virtually every country where it is in use.177
While codifying customary law would certainly make its
application a simpler process for Western courts, some scholars
have argued that “once custom has been codified or settled by
judicial decision, its binding force depends on the statute or the
doctrine of precedent” and it therefore loses the force and
flexibility of customary law, instead becoming a Western
creation.178 Others, however, have argued that customary law does
not exist until a court has acted.179 Nonetheless, regardless of
which definition of customary law ultimately prevails, it is true
that a certain degree of error regarding customary law is inevitable
due to judges’ unfamiliarity with customary law,180 and this error
is compounded by the ambiguity in customary law.181
After gaining a basic understanding of what customary law
means, it is necessary to apply the law. But this is much more
difficult than it appears. The reason that it is particularly difficult
175

Woodman, supra note 174, at 151. But see BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND
CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY 67 (Greenwood Press Publishers 1984) (1926) (claiming
that the law of primitive societies is distinguishable from their customs).
176
Antony Allott, The Judicial Ascertainment of Customary Law, in ESSAYS IN
AFRICAN LAW 72, 89 (1960).
177
While there are countries that respect cultural property, there are none that have
actually gone so far as to codify the customary law. See, e.g., Ghana, Copyright Act of
2005 (enacted May 17, 2005); Nigerian Copyright Act, (1999) Cap. 68, § 1(2)(b)
(Nigeria).
178
Allott, supra note 176, at 89.
179
See JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 82 (1909); JOHN
SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 41–43 (Glanville Williams ed., 11th ed. 1957).
180
See Woodman, supra note 174, at 141.
181
Bennett, supra note 98, at 44 (“According to common-law doctrine, rules that are
considered law may be presented to the courts by way of argument on the basis of
authoritative texts. Issues of fact, on the other hand, must be proved by leading evidence.
The ambiguous nature of customary law accounts, in part, for the strikingly different
approaches to proof and ascertainment in the two main sections of the South African
courts.”).
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to discuss which law to apply in the area of copyright is that there
is no hard and fast customary law in the area, as is the case in
customary law marriage, intestate succession, and wills.182
Statutes in countries that recognize customary law require the
courts to apply the customary law of the people subject to their
jurisdiction, where customary law would be appropriate.183 For
example, in Ghana, ‘“Any question as to the existence or content
of a rule of customary law is a question of law for the court.’”184
However, determining which customary law to apply is not as easy
a task as it might seem.
Western judges have a particularly difficult role because they
must straddle the line between applying customary law as it is
traditionally recognized and applying the customary law as they
might interpret it from a necessarily Western perspective.185 This
is because “the law works well only in systems where judges are
familiar with their sources.”186 “[H]owever, customary law derives
from the practices of particular communities; these practices differ
considerably from place to place, and they change constantly over
time.”187 Because the court is not part of that customary
community, it “cannot possibly know the law.”188
Even when these judges apply customary law as tradition
requires, there still remains a choice of law regarding different
groups’ traditions as applied to other, similar groups. For example,
South Africa has many different systems of customary law.189 The
Law of Evidence Amendment Act provides:
182

See infra note 237.
Woodman, supra note 174, at 128.
184
Id. at 139 (quoting Ghana, Courts Act of 1960, § 67 (current version at Courts
Decree of 1966, § 65)).
185
Id. at 143 (“The position of a judge in such a case will be similar to that of the
lawyer. If he ignores the law reports, and looks only, for example, to the body of rules
which the Accra people recognize as obligatory, he will be making a revolutionary break
with the well established practices of his profession.”).
186
Bennett, supra note 98, at 44.
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
See id. at 69 (“Implicit in this complex provision is a hierarchy of choice of law
rules . . . . [I]f the parties have not agreed on applicable law, the court must apply the law
of the place where defendant resides . . . . This rule may cause more problems than it
solves.”).
183
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In any suit or proceedings between Blacks who do
not belong to the same tribe, the court shall not in
the absence of any agreement between them with
regard to the particular system of indigenous law to
be applied in such suit or proceedings, apply any
system of indigenous law other than that which is in
operation at the place where the defendant or
respondent resides or carries on business or is
employed, or if two or more different systems are in
operation at that place (not being within a tribal
area), the court shall not apply any such system
unless it is the law of the tribe (if any) to which the
defendant or respondent belongs.190
This system creates difficulties arising in a number of
situations; for example, if the defendant is a resident of one area
and is employed in another, or if the place of residence is not
within a “tribal area.”191
Courts sometimes hold that if a custom was established for one
ethnic group, it raises a presumption that that custom also exists for
another group.192 For example, “Nigerian courts have sometimes
held themselves bound by Ghanaian decisions on customary law,
although there is no significant ethnic group common to both
countries.”193 This is quite obviously an area brimming with
confusion for judges who must apply customary law.
B. Problems: Under Statutory Schemes
While statutory schemes attempt to offer copyright protection
to traditional African music, a host of issues arise. African
conceptions of cultural heritage differ from their Western
counterparts at the most basic level; the Western conception is
focused on artistic, literary and performing works as creations in
and of themselves, whereas in Africa, music is within the realm of
cultural heritage.194 It is “inherently difficult to protect folk[
190
191
192
193
194

Id. (quoting Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 s. 1(3)).
Id. at 69–70.
See Woodman, supra note 174, at 139.
Id. (citing Awodiya v. Apoesho, [1959] N.W.L.R. 221 (Nigeria)).
Blakeney, supra note 25, at 6–7.
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music] under modern intellectual property laws which tend to be
prompted by concerns irrelevant to folk[ music]”195 because
Western statutory copyright protection simply may not apply to
traditional music “where the material is deemed [intangible,]
unoriginal and in the public domain.”196
First, the tangible form requirement presents a problem; most
statutory schemes require music to be in some tangible form to be
protected—either written down or recorded.197 However, much of
traditional tribal music cannot be written down, as it is everchanging and ephemeral.198 In one instant, the music is heard, and
in the next instant, it vanishes, which creates a fundamental
problem for protection within statutory schemes.199 Simply put,
folk songs which would probably qualify under a modern
copyright system may fail the test of fixation because there is no
recording of such works.200 It would be impractical to require that
folk songs be reduced to a tangible form because African tribal
culture is always changing; thus there is nothing “palpably present

195

Kuruk, supra note 25, at 776. Efforts at protecting these rights within Western
intellectual property frameworks “largely presume the objective to be . . . [defense]
against misappropriation . . . rather than reali[z]ing positive rights in traditional
knowledge development and management according to the customary law of the
community.” Gibson, supra note 50, at 17. Additionally:
[T]he system does not recogni[z]e and affirm such rights as rights
even if it calls them “rights.” It cannot do so without an unraveling
of its own miasmic and fragile identity, which would ensue from
accepting the insistent assertion of right by indigenous peoples.
Instead, and as part of its self-sustaining, its own delimited
foundation is projected onto indigenous peoples and it is their law
and their rights that are found to be spatially and temporally
contained.
Fitzpatrick & Joyce, supra note 86, at 178.
196
Gibson, supra note 50, at 18; see also Christine Haight Farley, Protecting Folklore
of Indigenous Peoples: Is Intellectual Property the Answer?, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1, 22
(1997); B.A. Botkin, Definitions of Folklore, in 1 FUNK AND WAGNALLS STANDARD
DICTIONARY OF FOLKLORE, MYTHOLOGY AND LEGEND 398, 399 (Maria Leach ed., 1949)
(discussing purely oral cultures in which folklore is passed through generations without
ever being fixed or frozen in a particular form).
197
See, e.g., Ghana, Copyright Act of 2005, § 1(2)(b) (enacted May 17, 2005); Nigerian
Copyright Act, (1999) Cap. 68, § 1(2)(b) (Nigeria).
198
See Hibbitts, supra note 40, at 951.
199
Id.
200
SODIPO, supra note 52, at 39.
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to protect.”201 Traditional Western protection by copyright is
incompatible with how creativity works in most African
societies.202
A second problem arises due to most statutory copyright
schemes’ requirement that a work be “original” in order to qualify
for protection.203 A work can only be considered original if it is
the product of the independent efforts of the author.204 This makes
the protection of traditional folk songs all the more difficult
because originality is almost impossible to establish.205
On a more abstract level, originality within folk music is
difficult to establish because the performer uses many different
sources of language, sounds, and rhythms that are part of the
common heritage.206 In fact, “‘the same theme may know as many
variations as there are performers.’ The base is shared knowledge,
which refers less to a repertoire of existing ‘texts’ but more to a
whole of social signs.”207
The idea that music must be original to be copyrightable does
not fit with the African tradition; 208 the idea that the author creates
201

Fitzpatrick & Joyce, supra note 86, at 174 (citing S. Kirsch, Lost Worlds:
Environmental Disaster, “Culture Loss,” and the Law, in 42/2 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY
167 (2001)).
202
Smiers, Creative Improper Property, supra note 91, at 8 (“Copyright normally
requires works to be fixed, but such a freezing of cultures is not how creativity works in
most societies in all corners of the planet.” (citing G. Dutfield, Traditional Knowledge
and Folklore, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: ARTICLES ON CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS
AND INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE 78 (W. Grosheide & J. Brinkhof eds., 2002))). In fact,
there is a very real fear “often expressed about the extending of intellectual property
rights to traditional knowledge, a fear that this extension will uproot traditional and
intangible resources, reducing them to some determinate form and thus facilitate their
exploitation and corruption.” Fitzpatrick & Joyce, supra note 86, at 174.
203
Kuruk, supra note 25, at 796 (citing Ghana, Copyright Law of 1985, § 2(2)(a)
(enacted Mar. 21, 1985), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT: MONTHLY REV. WORLD INTELL.
PROP. ORG. 423, 424 (1985) (legislating that a work is not eligible for copyright unless it
is original in character)).
204
Ghana, Copyright Law of 1985, § 2 (enacted Mar. 21, 1985).
205
Kuruk, supra note 25, at 796.
206
See Smiers, The Abolition of Copyrights, supra note 82, at 125.
207
Smiers, Creative Improper Property, supra note 91, at 6 (quoting B. DAOUDI AND H.
MILIANI, L’AVENTURE DU RAI. MUSIQUE ET SOCIETE (Paris: Editions du Seuil: 1996)).
This can be similar to the idea of jazz improvisation, which, similarly, fails the fixation
test discussed earlier. See supra Part I.
208
See Smiers, The Abolition of Copyrights, supra note 82, at 128.
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something out of nothing is a Western idea.209 What is closer to
reality is the concept that “[n]ot one person ever creates out of
nothing.”210 Each singer, musician, or performer uses cultural
heritage and adds something to it.211 Trying to force an originality
requirement on traditional African society is inherently unfair
because “individuals and communities have rights to maintain their
own cultural uniqueness” 212 and keep their traditional music safe
from would-be copyright infringers.
The third problem with statutory copyright protection is the
idea that traditional folk songs are not owned by a particular
individual, but rather, by the group as a whole.213 It is almost
impossible to recognize the author in the Western sense,214 which
makes it difficult to apply modern intellectual property
protections.215
Even when there is an individual creator, there is no sharp
divide between the creator of the music and the performer, or the
dancer who dances to that music, or the audience who listens to it;
209

See id. at 126.
Smiers, Creative Improper Property, supra note 91, at 16.
211
Id.
212
Mokgoro, supra note 108, at 1557. See generally BIOBAKU, supra note 48, at 19
(describing how traditions and songs are often intermingled between peoples).
213
For a discussion of these communal ownership rights, see supra Part I.B.1. See also
Smiers, The Abolition of Copyrights, supra note 82, at 126–27 (“The individual
appropriation of creations and inventions is a concept alien to many cultures . . . .
[T]here is no concept in many cultures of an individual exploiting a creation or invention
monopolistically for many decades.”).
214
Smiers, The Abolition of Copyrights, supra note 82, at 127; see also Mamie
Harmon, Definition of Folklore, in FUNK AND WAGNALLS STANDARD DICTIONARY OF
FOLKLORE, MYTHOLOGY AND LEGEND, 398, 399–400 (Maria Leach ed., 1949) (stating
that folklore is defined by the ways in which it is transmitted, such that the work of an
individual can become folklore as it is acquired as the symbol of a group and passed
through generations); Kuruk, supra note 25, at 796 (“For example, there may be a
problem identifying an individual who could claim authorship given the passage of
folklore through generations of people in the community. It is obvious that while an
individual may have indeed created a particular work of folklore, it would eventually
have been acquired and used by the society at large and gradually, with the passage of
time, have lost its individualistic traits.”); Kamal Puri, Cultural Ownership and
Intellectual Property Rights Post-Mabo: Putting Ideas into Action, 9 INTELL. PROP. J.
293, 307–08 (1995) (explaining that Aboriginal folklore derives from complex
relationships between generations of people and their land).
215
Kuruk, supra note 25, at 795.
210
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in African society, all of these individuals have ownership over the
music, whereas Western society usually gives ownership solely to
the author.216 In the Western tradition, there is a certain
preoccupation with expression as the means by which to gain
recognition; this is critical to the “natural justice and economic
justifications for intellectual property protection.”217 This Western
perspective is necessarily at odds with communal experiences of
cultural music because the Western tradition names the author as
the individual with rights to exclude others, 218 but African tribal
members all have access to and permission to use the music.219
A fourth problem arises when copyright protection is to be
extended over national boundaries. As demonstrated by the
enactment of the Berne Convention, the best way to ensure
adequate protection in all countries may be to extend protection of
national laws to foreign copyright holders and hope that other
countries would reciprocate the gesture.220
However, the
protection schemes tend to disproportionately favor the developed
countries whose intellectual property laws are already in existence,
and the underdeveloped countries have to scramble to follow
suit.221

216

See Smiers, The Abolition of Copyrights, supra note 82, at 126–28 and
accompanying text (“Even when copyrights are applied in many non-Western cultures, it
soon becomes clear that the ideology sustaining the system is not fit for the complexity of
the creative process. In the Western world there exists a sharp division between . . . the
composer and the performer. This is not the case in African music, which . . . is usually
associated with specific dances.”).
217
Gibson, supra note 50, at 21.
218
Id.; see also Fitzpatrick & Joyce, supra note 86, at 171 (“Prevalent modes of
protecting traditional knowledge and culture seek to determine the content of ‘traditional’
rights and the identity of their holders. However . . . such determination is impossible.”).
219
See Smiers, The Abolition of Copyrights, supra note 82, at 126–28.
220
SODIPO, supra note 52, at 20–21.
221
Smiers, The Abolition of Copyrights, supra note 82, at 129–30 (“The author’s
concept stands as a gate through which one must pass in order to acquire intellectual
property rights. At the moment, this is a gate that tends disproportionately to favo[]r the
developed countries’ contributions to world science and culture.”) (quoting JAMES
BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY 124–28 (1991)). For a discussion of the issues that can arise in
situations where there is a conflict of law between two different areas, see supra Part
I.B.3.
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III. RESOLUTION: A NEW DIRECTION FOR CUSTOMARY LAW
COPYRIGHTS
Quite simply, “intellectual property” is not the correct regime
to be implemented if the goal is to offer adequate protections to
traditional tribal music.222 What is necessary is a new concept
based on traditional African ideas and social norms. A system that
naturally flows and works with the traditional customary law
would be much more constructive than “trying to make the forms
of protection fit within a framework which was never designed for
them and where the existing users and developers of copyright
notions resist strenuously any such development.”223
Forcing Western intellectual property forms onto traditional
African customs can only challenge the form of custom itself,224
which would serve only to erase an important part of African
culture. In truth, the only reason that copyright is seen as an
appropriate frame of reference to the protection of indigenous
music is because there is sufficient superficial similarity between
music of the Western tradition and African tribal music.225
However, that superficial similarity—that both are auditory
music—is a ludicrous reason to force a different, Western-style
creative intent on a completely different form of African art.
While some would suggest that the “essence of our
communication as human beings” should be liberated from control
by corporate holders and allowed to return to the public domain,226
that line of thinking is dangerous; it leaves African culture open to
easy abuse and misappropriation.227 It would be much more
appropriate to view “[t]he object of protection . . . not necessarily
[as] the resource as an end in itself but the ability of the

222

Id. at 129.
Id. (quoting Follow-Up to the Green Paper on Copyright and Related Rights in the
Information Society, COM (1996) 568 final (Nov. 20, 1996)).
224
Fitzpatrick & Joyce, supra note 86, at 186.
225
Id. at 185.
226
Smiers, The Abolition of Copyrights, supra note 82, at 132.
227
Much of traditional African music is unprotected even within its own region from
the greedy eyes of potential misappropriators, which makes the notion of freeing the
“essence of our communication as human beings” simply unworkable in a practical
sense.
223
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community to continue to function and observe internal
differentiation and communal integrity through its management
and deployment of resources.”228 Western society needs to
approach copyright protection from the viewpoint of respect for
cultural diversity, rather than from the “perspective of the value of
traditional knowledge as commodities in trade.”229
African countries that already recognize the protection of folk
music should “be urged to adopt an . . . arrangement to regulate the
use of folklore outside of the region.”230 While this is a good idea,
creating a government agency to handle the integration of
customary law recognition231 only serves to feed into the
bureaucracy and create more red tape for traditional Africans to
gain the protection they need and would not be an effective system
to implement.
The best way to approach this problem is not to force a
Western-style scheme of protection on a customary law system
that does not share the same values in copyright protection, but
rather, to streamline the court system so that more cases where
customary law is appropriate to use may be heard. Streamlining
the cases would require a more formal docketing system, whereby
applicants to the court would have specific dates and times.232
To be most effective, the system must have local branches, or
perhaps simply individuals in each region, who might be in charge
of keeping track of the cases in that area. That way, the applicants
would have less difficulty in traveling to the court for an additional
day to file their papers; they would only have to be in the
courtroom for the day of their hearing. These changes would make
the court much more accessible to a greater number of traditional
people.
228
Gibson, supra note 50, at 16; see also id. at 27 (“A community model for the
protection and management of traditional knowledge will be ineffectual if indeed that
model continues the historical archiving of community, the nostalgia of ‘tradition,’ and
the morali[z]ing of the protection and safeguarding of the traditional community as a
global ‘public good.’”).
229
Id. at 17.
230
Kuruk, supra note 25, at 841.
231
See id. at 841–44.
232
Customary law courts are often conducted on a first-come, first-served basis, with
no written record and few formalities. See Koyana, supra note 97, at 4.
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Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, African statutory
judges must receive a more comprehensive training in the
customary law of their jurisdiction. This is because the judges who
know the most about the law are able to adjudicate disputes most
fairly.233
Once Western court judges are given a deeper
understanding of the customary law systems, they would be better
able to adjudicate the customary law disputes with the same degree
of precision they approach the Western disputes.234 While this
plan would certainly be difficult to administer, and would create
much work for the judges, the ease or difficulty of application
should never govern the solution.
In order to facilitate this new system, the traditional people of a
certain area should be directed to a specific court, so that the
judges in each particular court have the least possible amount of
new information to absorb. Local courts would have to be
established. This would serve two purposes. Firstly, it would
allow the people of that region to have a court sitting in their
jurisdiction, hearing the issues occurring in that community, and
would allow them to settle disputes without having to travel too
far. Secondly, it would make judges’ jobs much easier in that they
would have to learn fewer different customary law systems. The
fewer systems the judges have to learn, the more intimately
familiar they will be able to become with the systems they do
know, which would lead to fairer and more even-handed
adjudication of customary law disputes.
Each country must play a vital role in this re-education of the
judiciary; there must be standards of knowledge for customary law,
just as there are standards for statutory and common law. The
customary law that would be applied in a certain situation must
have the same force as a statute that might be applied in a similar,
non-traditional setting; the closest scheme to this suggested one is

233

Id.
It is important to keep in mind the dualist system existing in many African countries.
There are two separate court systems: one which is run as a Western system (what most
readers will be familiar with) and one which is a customary law court system, presided
over by traditional African judges practicing customary law. Id.
234
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that of Nigeria.235 South Africa’s Constitution also sets a good
example for the recognition of the legitimacy of customary law
concurrent with statutory law236 because the South African
Constitution has provisions for customary law and its
implementation.237 Only in this way would customary law be on
equal footing with statutory law in the protections that they afford
to traditional people.
The insider/outsider problem certainly needs addressing if a
customary law system is to be enforceable. It is unclear as to
whether this problem would be best solved by statutory additions
to customary practices or through individualized judicial
determinations. The fair use of insiders and protection against
misappropriation of music by outsiders are issues that the
legislatures and judicial systems of various African countries must
explore further.
CONCLUSION
Through a discussion of the various schemes of customary and
statutory law, this Note has highlighted the need for a shift in
thinking. What I propose is not a violent shift, or an unalterable
one, but rather a solution that works with the natural flow of two
different, yet co-existent cultures. Perhaps if these intercultural
protections had been in place at the time of Solomon Linda’s rise
to fame, he would not have died in abject poverty, without the
recognition or payment he so deserved.
Through recognition of the differences between customary and
statutory law, it is possible to engender respect for both schemes.
Only through respect and mutual enforcement can these two
systems coexist harmoniously.
235

This is because Nigerian copyright protection eschews many of the traditional
qualities a work must have before protection is allowed. Nigeria has a very inclusive
scheme for protection of traditional music because it attempts to circumvent the problems
with tangible form and ownership requirements to which many other countries rigidly
adhere. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
236
See Mokgoro, supra note 108, at 1557; see also S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 211(1)–(3).
237
The customary law provisions are generally about customary law marriage and
intestate succession; there is virtually no coverage of intellectual property issues. See
Koyana, supra note 97, at 27.

